BEYOND THE PROMISES: A DECADE OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL COMMITMENTS AT THE NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK

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ANURADHA MUNSHI

Introduction

The New Development Bank (NDB) is the multilateral lender created by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) to fund infrastructure and sustainable development across emerging economies. Over its first decade, it has grown into a multibillion-dollar institution with a portfolio dominated by transport infrastructure — while also becoming a focal point for criticism over transparency, accountability, and the gap between its "sustainable development" branding, weak safeguard policies and some of the projects it has financed.

Origins and founding- geopolitics behind the emergence of New Development Bank

A Rising Bloc

The BRICS acronym began as a Goldman Sachs investment thesis in 2001, describing four economies whose scale would reshape global growth. It became a political fact once these countries started meeting as a bloc from 2009 onward, later adding South Africa. Later, the BRICS share of the world economy climbed from roughly 8% in 2002 to over 22% by 2015. By the mid-2020s, the expanded bloc represented close to two-thirds of the developing world's economic output.
With this rise in power and the changing reality the BRICS bloc consistently issued demands for a fundamental overhaul of the Bretton Woods system. Since its initial summits, the group has argued that the governing structures of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are disproportionately favoring Western powers and failing to reflect the realities of the modern global economy. The IMF and World Bank, built at Bretton Woods in 1944, allocated voting power largely by capital subscription — a system that entrenched the dominance of the US, Western Europe, and Japan long after the global economy had moved on.

In 2010, the IMF agreed to a quota reform that would have modestly rebalanced voting shares toward emerging economies. Then it remained unratified, for five years — blocked by the US Congress, which alone held enough voting share to prevent the reform from taking legal effect. The reform only cleared in late 2015, by which point BRICS had already stopped waiting.

This was one of the most proximate causes of the NDB's creation. It converted a long-standing grievance about underrepresentation into a concrete, visible failure of the existing system to reform itself — and gave BRICS leaders a ground for building alternatives rather than continuing to lobby for a larger slice of an institution that was not willing to change with time.

Conditionality clause

The other reason was about what the World Bank and IMF money came attached with. Loans from these institutions have historically carried policy conditions — fiscal targets, governance reforms, structural adjustment. For countries that had lived through IMF-mandated austerity programs, the conditionality wasn't a technical detail; it was the whole point of contention in a way arm twisting countries into changing their internal policies, laws and governance.

The 2008 global financial crisis sharpened this clarity for BRICS governments. A crisis that originated inside Western banks and housing markets — not in the developing world — nonetheless battered trade flows and capital access across emerging economies. The lesson many BRICS leaders drew was blunt: instability could be manufactured in New York or London and exported globally, yet the burden

of adjustment, and the terms of any relief, would still be set by the same institutions that had failed to prevent the crisis in the first place. If the system's risks were shared involuntarily, BRICS argued, its governance and its safety nets should be shared too.

Building of the NDB as the Alternative

The response, formalized at the 2014 Fortaleza summit, was two-pronged. The New Development Bank would supply project financing — starting with infrastructure and sustainable development — outside the conditionality model. Alongside it, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement would function as an emergency liquidity backstop, a rough analogue to the IMF's crisis lending, giving members a $100 billion pool to draw on during balance-of-payments stress without first negotiating terms with the US Treasury or Washington-based institutions.

The design choices embedded in the NDB were deliberately different from the institutions it was answering. Where IMF and World Bank voting power scales with financial contribution — concentrating power among the wealthiest shareholders — NDB's five founding members took equal shareholding and equal voting power. No

founder holds a veto. It was a structural statement: this institution would not simply recreate, in miniature, the imbalance its founders objected to. The bank's headquarters went to Shanghai, reflecting China's financial weight, but leadership was designed to rotate — India's K.V. Kamath became the first president, with Brazil's Dilma Rousseff later taking the role, precisely so the NDB would not read as a Chinese vehicle wearing a BRICS label.

This was also a contrast with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, launched around the same period. The AIIB pursued scale and Western buy-in — dozens of US allies joined despite Washington's objections — but in exchange, China held effective veto power through differentiated shareholding. The NDB chose the opposite trade: smaller, slower-growing, but power-sharing by design. Both were responses to the same underlying grievance.

The NDB's origins were never purely technical. They were geopolitical from the outset: a rebuke to a reform process that had stalled, a rejection of externally imposed conditionality, and an assertion that the emerging world's growing economic weight needed to translate into institutional weight of its own. Whether the NDB has since matched that founding ambition in practice is a separate question — but the grievances that produced it were concrete, cumulative, and a decade in the making before Fortaleza ever happened.

The official forming of NDB

The idea of a BRICS-led development bank was floated as early as the group's 2012 summit in New Delhi and formalized two years later. The Agreement on the New Development Bank was signed on 15 July 2014 during the Sixth BRICS Summit in Fortaleza, Brazil, alongside a parallel financial instrument, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, meant to help members manage balance-of-payment pressures.

The bank's agreement entered into force at the following year's BRICS summit in Ufa, Russia, in July 2015, and the NDB's Board of Governors held its inaugural meeting on 7 July 2015, appointing India's K.V. Kamath as its first president. NDB was founded with authorized capital of $100 billion and initial subscribed capital of $50 billion — $10 billion paid in and $40 billion callable — split equally among the five founders. Each founding member holds equal shareholding and voting power, with no single country holding veto power, a deliberate departure from the weighted-voting structures of the IMF and World Bank.

Since 2021, NDB has expanded beyond its five founders. Bangladesh, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Uruguay joined between 2021 and 2023, and the bank has continued to add members, including Algeria, Colombia, and Uzbekistan, along with Indonesia's 2025 announcement — made during a visit by President Rousseff — that it would join, explicitly framed by Jakarta around access to NDB financing for renewable energy, biodiesel, and technological development.

Sectoral Investment Portfolio

As per NDB, by the end of December 2025, NDB's Board of Directors had cumulatively approved around USD 43.01 billion for 139 projects in the Bank's member countries. As of the end of December 2025, there were 115 projects in the

Bank's active portfolio with total NDB financing amounting to more than USD 35.6 billion.

An independent breakdown published by Devex in September 2025 offers additional details: since its founding, NDB has completed 17 projects worth $10.5 billion, held 92 approved and active projects worth $24.7 billion, had 28 proposed projects worth $7.8 billion in its pipeline, and had cancelled 14 projects worth $4.1 billion. These figures reflect NDB's own financing contribution only and exclude co-financing from partner institutions, so total project costs are often larger.

Sector distribution. Transportation is by a wide margin NDB's largest sector. As per the Devex analysis, it accounts for $13.1 billion in approved financing across 38 projects, well ahead of multisectoral projects ($3.8 billion, 19 projects), energy ($2.9 billion), and water and sanitation ($2.4 billion). NDB's own 2023 Annual Report shows the same skew for that single year: of $2.1 billion approved across nine loans in 2023, transport infrastructure took 63.4% of the total, followed by multi-area projects (17.8%), water and sanitation (15.3%), and digital infrastructure (3.5%); 94.1% of that year's approvals were sovereign or sovereign-guaranteed. The pipeline shows a similar ordering: transportation ($3 billion, nine projects), energy ($1.1 billion, five projects), social infrastructure ($1 billion, five projects), and water and sanitation ($611 million, three projects).

This represents a shift from the bank's earliest years. President Kamath told NDB's second Annual Meeting that of the bank's first seven approved projects — worth over $1.5 billion — six were renewable energy projects and only one was in transport financing, a mix he described as a deliberate focus on "green and environmentally sustainable projects" while the bank built its foundations. NDB issued its first green bond that same year. By its second full strategy cycle, transportation had become the dominant sector by dollar volume, a trajectory critics have cited as evidence the bank has drifted from its original green-infrastructure emphasis.

Strategic targets: NDB's General Strategy for 2022–2026, approved by the Board of Governors in May 2022, set a goal of deploying $30 billion from the bank's own balance sheet over the cycle. Other numeric targets include directing 30% of financing to local currencies, 30% to non-sovereign operations, co-financing 20% of projects (by number) with partner multilateral banks, and directing 40% of total approvals to projects supporting climate change mitigation and adaptation.

On the climate target, an analysis published in The Diplomat notes that NDB's climate-related portfolio grew from $5.7 billion to $8.1 billion between 2023 and 2024, though it remains concentrated in middle-income BRICS members. On the local-currency target, actual disbursement has run well below the 30% goal — recent-year local-currency lending was under a quarter of total disbursements, dominated by Chinese renminbi and, increasingly, South African rand.

Policy Framework: The Environmental and Social Framework

NDB's core safeguard policy is its Environmental and Social Framework (ESF), organized around a set of Environmental and Social Standards. ESS1 governs environmental and social risk assessment, requiring early identification of impacts — covering biodiversity, pollution, resource efficiency, and climate risk — along with stakeholder engagement and ongoing monitoring. ESS2 governs involuntary resettlement, requiring that displacement be avoided or minimized where possible, with fair compensation, livelihood restoration, and particular attention to vulnerable groups where it cannot be avoided. Each project is screened and assigned a risk category, and NDB reviews client assessments against both its own standards and national regulations.

The bank's defining structural choice is its reliance on "country systems": rather than having a NDB-specific environmental, social, and procurement framework, the bank uses the borrower country's own systems to handle these dimensions of a project. On disclosure, NDB issued an Interim Information Disclosure Policy in 2016 — a policy that, as of the most recent civil society assessments, remains only "interim" nearly a decade later. Section 23 of the ESF commits the bank to working with clients so that environmental and social documents are made available in a timely manner, in an accessible place, and in languages understandable to affected communities.

An independent scoring exercise gives a concrete sense of where the bank stands in practice: the 2025 DFI Transparency Index, run by the NGO Publish What You Fund, gave NDB 50% on its environmental and social global disclosure policy and 75% on its community disclosure policy, but the bank scored zero on indicators tied to an Independent Accountability Mechanism, because it does not have one, and its overall non-sovereign portfolio ranked second-last out of the 22 development finance institutions assessed, with a score of 20.2 out of 100.

NDB's Sustainable Financing Policy Framework separately governs its green, social, and sustainability bond issuances, covering use of proceeds, project evaluation, and reporting, and the bank later issued a "Covid Response Bond" to fund members' pandemic response.

The Independent Evaluation Office

NDB's Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) is responsible for evaluating the bank's policies, strategies, processes, and operations, and for overseeing the quality of the bank's internal self-evaluation activities. Structurally, the IEO reports directly and exclusively to the Board of Directors rather than to bank management — a reporting line intended to preserve its independence. Its work so far includes a corporate-level review of NDB's policy framework, an evaluation of NDB's financial architecture, and

— its most substantial undertaking to date — a thematic evaluation of NDB's energy-sector financing in South Africa, which touches directly on the Medupi coal controversy.

The New Development Bank still does not have mechanisms that communities can use to hold it accountable or seek redress.

Critique of NDB's policies and investments:

Since its very inception NDB's policies and investments have raised concerns over its commitment to accountability, transparency and investment priorities. This section delves into some of these concerns.

1. **Transparency and access to information:** Although the ESF commits NDB to making project documents available in an accessible, timely, and locally understandable way, this is far from the reality. Assessments published in 2018 and 2021 — including work commissioned by Oxfam South Africa — found the bank's practice falls well short of that commitment, with only general project summaries publicly available rather than full environmental and social documentation.
A mid-term evaluation of NDB's Africa program made this its headline finding, reporting that affected communities struggle to access information on NDB-funded or co-funded projects.

2. **Reliance on country systems, compounded by non-disclosure agreements:** NDB's biggest accountability weakness is its over reliance on country systems. Relying on borrower countries' own environmental, social, and procurement systems comes with the assumption that every member country has systems adequate to protect the rights of affected communities — and non-disclosure agreements between NDB and client governments add a further, formal barrier restricting what communities and civil society groups can access, on top of whatever gaps exist in the underlying national system.

In comparison to other MDB's like, the World Bank safeguards impose specific, binding restrictions around environmental and social policies. NDB's reliance on country systems leaves the actual protective standard unclear, since the institution does not specify in detail the parameters those national systems must meet.

3. No independent accountability mechanism: When NDB was created, there was an expectation that it would set a new standard for transparency and accountability, including an independent accountability mechanism through which affected communities could file complaints. After more than a decade of its existence this has yet to materialize. For much of its existence, NDB had no dedicated grievance redress or an independent accountability mechanism through which communities affected by its projects could formally lodge complaints, and its environmental and social safeguards have been seen as vague and less enforceable.

While the bank has since adopted an Environment and Social Framework and moved toward project-level grievance handling but this has its limitations as at project level there there is always fear of reprisals to those complains and the the affected communities. The absence of strong, independent accountability channels/mechanism remains a key structural weakness for NDB. It still lacks a body where a specific community can directly petition about a specific project.

4. Vague definitions of key concepts: NDB's socio-environmental approach is weakened by ambiguous definitions of core terms, including "sustainable infrastructure" itself, which gives both the bank and borrower-country systems wide discretion in interpreting compliance. A retrospective published by Dialogue Earth on the bank's first decade summarized the problem bluntly: outside observers find NDB's investment criteria vague, to the point that a project as ecologically contentious as paving a stretch of the Trans-Amazonian Highway could still receive the bank's "sustainable" label.

Case studies

The concerns over NDB's policy and implementation of existing policies are no longer theoretical and we have concrete examples of its impact on communities and environment. A lot has already been researched and written about the impact of some of these projects.

Across Brazil, South Africa, and India, three NDB-financed projects — the Araripe III Wind Complex, Eskom's Medupi coal plant, and the Manipur water and wetland projects — reveal the same structural weakness playing out in different sectors and countries. None of these are isolated failures. They are what happens when a bank builds its entire safeguard model around trusting borrower-country systems, without building an independent channel to catch what those systems miss.

Araripe III (Brazil): NDB put roughly $67 million into a 156-turbine wind complex serving 400,000 homes — a genuine clean-energy success by output. But research by Conectas, Instituto Maíra, the International Accountability Project, and the Semiarid Renewable Energy Committee, based on field visits from 2020–2022, found the project fractured the local quilombola community. Because residents weren't organized to negotiate collectively, the developer struck deals family by family, and turbine noise and wildlife deaths went undocumented in any process NDB ran directly. NDB's founding promise of consultation-first development gave way, in practice, to the same insufficient engagement patterns older banks were criticized for.

Medupi (South Africa): NDB approved roughly $480 million toward Eskom's Medupi coal plant in 2019, on-lent through the Development Bank of Southern Africa. The

harm here wasn't just reputational — it was structural: because money is fungible inside a borrowing institution, financing Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA)’s "green" transmission lines freed up the rest of DBSA's balance sheet to keep backing coal elsewhere, including the Thabametsi plant. NDB's safeguards assessed the loan it made, not what the recipient institution did with its freed-up capacity next door.

Manipur (India): NDB’s $312 million water supply loan flows through Manipur's Public Health Engineering Department, whose Senapati district dashboards claimed near-100% household tap coverage in villages where, per EastMojo's 2025 investigation, no functioning taps existed at all. That finding escalated into a November 2025 Manipur High Court PIL naming NDB directly — with one village literally tagged "(NDB Project)" in the filing — alleging falsified data and diverted funds. Separately, NDB's own $87.84 million Lamphelpat wetland project, unlike NDB's Category A/B/C system used for other projects (e.g., the Imphal sewerage project, rated Category B), Lamphelpat's environmental and social risk category is recorded as "U" for undisclosed in the independent tracking database highlights failure in terms of transparency and NDB's disclosure practices. NDB has still labeled their Disclosure policy as interim and gaps in practical project-level disclosures and policies as compared to other global development banks are glaring. The failure of NDB is that it has no mechanism of its own to notice when execution diverges from design, and no channel for the people affected to make it notice. With weak policies and over reliance on country systems and absent redressal mechanism, it is not a surprise that the NDB ended up funding projects that were highly detrimental to the interests of communities and environment.

NDB’s Green and Climate Investments

The NDB markets itself as a climate-conscious alternative to the World Bank — issuing the first green bond ever traded on the China Interbank Bond Market, setting a target of directing 40% of total approvals to climate mitigation and adaptation, and describing itself as committed to never financing new coal capacity. Civil society

groups and researchers argue the record behind that branding is considerably messier, and that the gaps trace back to the same structural weaknesses — vague standards, weak disclosure, no independent accountability mechanism — that define NDB's broader accountability problem.

A drift toward carbon-intensive lending: Despite an initial wave of renewable-energy projects in NDB's first years, the bank has increasingly financed the kind of traditional, carbon-intensive infrastructure that has proven damaging to climate goals — the Medupi loan being the glaring example.
Loose or self-defined sustainability criteria: Unlike the World Bank, which developed detailed environmental and social safeguards through extensive consultation, NDB has kept its sustainability commitments comparatively vague, while delegating community consultation to client governments.
"Sustainable infrastructure" stretched to cover damaging projects: Beyond coal financing, NDB's financing for paving the Trans-Amazonian Highway, which environmental groups have time and again reiterated has facilitated deforestation, is an example of the "sustainable development" label being applied loosely.
Structural pressure from private capital markets: NDB's growing reliance on private capital markets to fund its lending — necessary to protect its credit rating and stay commercially viable — creates pressure to prioritize bankable, fast-closing deals over its development mandate, and discourages the kind of civil society due diligence that might slow transactions or unsettle investors.

Recommendations

1. **Independent Accountability Mechanism:** The single most important recommendation is for NDB to create a body where affected communities can directly petition when a project appears to violate the bank's own policies

— separate from country-level grievance redress, independent of NDB Management, and accessible with minimal barriers to entry.

2. **Review of their Environment and Social Framework:** With more than a decade of the NDB's existence, it is imperative that they do an independent evaluation and review of their Environment and Social Framework (ESF, adopted 2016) and bring it upto well-established benchmark set by most MDBs and DFIs like the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and IFC. Additionally, NDB needs to have stand alone policies on gender, labour, energy sector policy etc.
3. **NDB's Information Disclosure Policy** has remained "interim" since 2016. There is an urgent need for the bank to finalize a permanent policy that operationalizes Section 23 of its own Environmental and Social Framework — publishing full project-level environmental and social documentation, not just summaries, in a timely manner and in languages understandable to affected communities.
4. **Limit the use of non-disclosure agreements:** The bank must narrow the scope of confidentiality clauses in its lending agreements and publish clear criteria for when confidentiality is genuinely warranted, rather than applying it by default.
5. **Publish clear, binding parameters for "country systems" reliance:** Unlike the World Bank's globally consistent safeguards, NDB does not specify in detail what a borrower country's environmental and social system must meet to qualify as adequate. NDB must publish explicit minimum parameters — potentially benchmarked against ESF standards — that a country system must satisfy before a project can rely on it, with a mechanism to flag and strengthen systems that fall short
6. **Create a formal channel for civil society input into policy, not just projects.** Beyond individual project consultation, civil society groups want a standing mechanism — such as the proposed regular meetings between NDB and its Civil Society Forum — that allows input into the bank's overall policies and strategies while they are being drafted or reviewed, not only after they are finalized.
7. **Define "sustainable infrastructure" with enforceable criteria.** Several commentators recommend NDB replace its currently loose sustainability language with clearer, more specific eligibility criteria, so that projects like highway paving through ecologically sensitive areas cannot qualify for the bank's "sustainable" label on the strength of ambiguous wording alone.
8. **Adopt an explicit, firm no-fossil-fuel-finance commitment.** Opinion pieces published around Indonesia's 2025 accession specifically recommend that NDB state, unambiguously, that it will not finance fossil fuel projects directly or indirectly — including "transitional" categories such as captive power plants and coal-biomass co-firing — with safeguards that go beyond the minimum standards set by institutions like the IFC.
9. **Close the fungibility loophole in on-lending.** Where NDB lends through intermediary institutions (as with South Africa's DBSA), it is recommended that the bank require ring-fencing or end-use tracking robust enough that financing a "green" tranche cannot free up an intermediary's balance sheet to expand its own fossil-fuel lending elsewhere.

10. **NDB along with the FI clients must disclose basic sub-project data** (name, sector, location) for investments, and "ring-fence" FI capital for specified purposes while explicitly excluding high-risk sectors.

A decade after its founding, NDB has built a portfolio comparable in scale to some long-established regional development banks, with transportation infrastructure now its dominant sector and financing still concentrated among its five founding members. Its institutional architecture has matured — an evaluation policy, strategy, and manual are now in place, and the Independent Evaluation Office produces genuine, Board-facing assessments of the bank's performance. But the accountability gap civil society identified in the bank's earliest years remains largely unaddressed. As NDB enters what BRICS leaders have called its "second golden decade," with new members like Indonesia bringing both opportunity and fresh fossil-fuel exposure, these questions about transparency, accountability, and the substance of its "sustainable development" mandate are likely to remain the central point of contention between the bank and its commitments.

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

Inside India's Project Landscape

Indira Gandhi Canal Rehabilitation: Delivery, Distribution, and Accountability Concerns in NDB's Rajasthan Water Project

IVIRAH AGARWAL

The **Rajasthan Water Sector Restructuring Project for the Desert Areas**, supported by the New Development Bank (NDB), is presented as a major intervention to rehabilitate the Indira Gandhi Canal system, reduce seepage, reclaim waterlogged land, improve irrigation efficiency, and strengthen agriculture in western Rajasthan. The project addresses a genuine developmental problem: Rajasthan is highly water-scarce, and the canal is crucial to supplying water for farming and households in the Thar region.

Yet the project also reveals a difficult contradiction in development finance. A canal-rehabilitation initiative intended to improve water security has been implemented amid delays, planned water shut-offs, disputes over water distribution, and recurring farmer protests. The issue is not whether repairing the canal is necessary. It plainly is. The question is whether NDB financing and Rajasthan's Water Resources Department have ensured that rehabilitation is carried out transparently, on schedule, and without transferring excessive livelihood risks onto farmers and water-dependent communities.

A Large Project With High Stakes

NDB approved financing for the Rajasthan Water Sector Restructuring Project in November 2017. The project is to be implemented by the Government of Rajasthan through its Water Resources Department. Its stated objective is to rehabilitate deteriorated sections of the Indira Gandhi Canal system, reduce conveyance losses from seepage, conserve water, improve irrigation efficiency, and reclaim waterlogged land. The project also includes micro-irrigation and capacity-building components for farmers, water-users' associations, and public institutions.

The scale is substantial. NDB's project documentation states that more than 990 km of canal system are to be rehabilitated with an estimated overall cost of USD 495 million. The intervention is framed as environmentally beneficial. Canal lining and desilting are expected to reduce seepage, improve water-carrying capacity, limit waterlogging, and enable more productive agricultural use of land. In a state where agriculture remains a major livelihood source and water scarcity is structural, those goals are socially significant. However, infrastructure efficiency is not the same as water justice. A canal can be repaired while farmers still face unreliable supply, poorly timed closures, unequal distribution, crop losses, and weak avenues to question implementation decisions.

The Rehabilitation–Water Supply Dilemma

The central accountability problem is that the canal requires periodic closure to enable major repair and relining works, but the same canal is a lifeline for drinking water and irrigation. This creates a direct conflict between long-term infrastructure rehabilitation and immediate water needs.

The Water Resources Department had reportedly carried out canal rejuvenation works since 2020 through annual shutdowns of roughly 60 days, generally between late March and late May. These closures allowed workers to undertake repairs, relining, and other rehabilitation activities. Yet they also interrupted the water supply on which western Rajasthan's households and farmers rely.

In 2024, the Rajasthan government decided not to proceed with the planned two-month closure during the summer period. According to The Times of India, the decision was influenced by the Lok Sabha election period and concerns over drinking-water shortages in ten north-western districts during peak heat. The immediate political and humanitarian logic was understandable: shutting the canal during a severe summer could worsen hardship for water-dependent communities. But avoiding closure also meant postponing rehabilitation. The remaining work could not be completed without the shutdown and that the revised February 2025 project deadline would not be met. This exposes a structural planning weakness: the project's design appears to have depended on extended canal closures without sufficiently resolving how drinking-water security, agricultural demand, heat stress, and electoral constraints would be managed at the same time.

A sustainable water project should not force a binary choice between repairing a canal and supplying water to people who depend on it. If closures are unavoidable, the implementing agency should publish a credible mitigation plan specifying alternative water arrangements, timing, district-level allocations, protection for vulnerable communities, and a clear mechanism for compensation or emergency support where livelihoods are affected.

Distributional Conflict and Farmer Exclusion

Farmer mobilisation across the canal command area demonstrates that water insecurity is not simply a technical matter but a question of distribution, accountability, and trust.

In February 2025, farmers in Rajasthan's Bikaner division held protests and blocked highways to demand additional water releases through the Indira Gandhi Canal. The protests, led by the Sanyukta Kisan Morcha, took place at several locations including Rawla, Ghadsana, and Jaitsar. Farmers argued that the available canal water was not being distributed at full capacity and warned that the protests would continue if their demands were not met.

The report does not establish that the NDB-funded rehabilitation works caused this water shortage. The immediate dispute concerned water allocation and releases, which are shaped by a wider set of factors: seasonal availability, canal operations, state-level decisions, drinking-water priorities, and the distribution of water between branches and users. Nevertheless, the protests are directly relevant to the NDB project because its stated purpose is to improve the canal's ability to deliver water more efficiently and reliably.

Earlier reporting also illustrates these tensions. In 2023, farmers in Jaisalmer submitted a memorandum complaining that reduced canal water was threatening rabi crops. They alleged that water that should have reached their area was being diverted or distributed to other districts, including Ganganagar, Hanumangarh, and Bikaner. These reports show that water conflict is not a temporary issue emerging only after rehabilitation works; it is embedded in the political economy of the canal system.

The NDB project includes capacity building for local water-users' associations and farmers. But the public record raises a critical question: were water users meaningfully involved in deciding when closures would occur, which stretches would be prioritised, how temporary shortages would be managed, and how water would be allocated during rehabilitation?If participation is limited to technical training after major decisions are already made then it does not amount to meaningful community engagement.

A Narrow View of Social Risk

NDB categorises the project's first and second phases as **Category B**, meaning that impacts are regarded as limited, site-specific, and manageable through mitigation. This identifies likely impacts primarily in terms of desilting, canal relining, silt disposal, and construction activity. It states that an Environmental and Social Impact Management Plan has been proposed and that regular monitoring is intended to ensure compliance.

The classification may be defensible in a narrow construction-risk sense. Canal rehabilitation does not necessarily require mass displacement; however, this language risks equating social impact only with physical resettlement or land acquisition.

For an irrigation-dependent population, social risk also includes loss of reliable irrigation and water availability, unequal water distribution, and insufficient information about shutdowns and releases. In other words, there may be no physical displacement while there is still substantial livelihood disruption. This is particularly important in western Rajasthan, where water scarcity magnifies the social consequences of interrupted supply.

The 2024 decision to cancel the planned closure demonstrates this point. The government itself recognised that a shutdown could create unacceptable pressure on drinking-water availability during the summer. That acknowledgement should have triggered a more transparent public discussion of how project-related closures affect different users and what measures protect the communities most exposed to the disruption.

Conclusion

The Rajasthan Water Sector Restructuring Project shows why water infrastructure cannot be evaluated as a purely engineering exercise. This project has the potential to conserve scarce water, improve canal capacity, reclaim waterlogged land, and support agricultural livelihoods. But delays, closure-related dilemmas, and farmer protests over irrigation releases reveal that technical objectives do not automatically translate into socially legitimate outcomes.

Lamphelpat Wetland Rejuvenation: Transparency and Accountability Concerns in NDB's Project

RAM WANGKHEIRAKPAM & DONALD TAKHELL

The Lamphelpat Waterbody Rejuvenation Project in Manipur, funded by the New Development Bank (NDB), has raised serious concerns among environmental groups in the state. While the name of the project seems to portray rejuvenation of a very critical wetland in the Imphal valley, but the naming has belied the people at large. The actual project is not about wetland rejuvenation but destroying the wetland itself, and NDB, as a willing partner and enabler through its funds, partakes in its destruction.

Wetland Misclassification

Lamphelpat is a wetland and officially listed by the Manipur State Wetlands Authority. Pat is a Meitei word for a wetland. Lamphelpat literally means Lamphel Wetland. Yet, NDB's project description refers to it merely as a "water body." A river is a legal category. A wetland is a legal category, however, water body is not a legal category and thus has no legal and institutional protection mechanism.The state categorization of Lamphelpat as just a water body has been used to bypass both existing international and national protection mechanisms of wetlands. Not only that, NDB has hoodwinked the Ministry of Environment and Forest and Climate Change and the Manipur State Wetlands Authority.

Interestingly, MSWA has also prepared the scantily prepared Brief Document for Lamphelpat. At the event the CM announced a hefty amount of Rs 665 crore for Lamphelpat Waterbody Rejuvenation Project. This money is being borrowed from New Development Bank (NDB) which is also known as the BRICS bank. In the project summary there is no mention of wetlands. The project is to be handled by the Water Resource Department with no involvement of the MSWA. Lamphelpat is defined as a Waterbody in the project documents. But, there is no legal category called 'Waterbody'. Intentionally categorising Lamphelpat as a waterbody the government allows itself to do whatever it pleases even though to the public it claims it is saving Lamphelpat.

Transparency Failures

There's no project report of any kind on their website except for a very brief description. Several efforts to reach NDB on their online information access site were met with stone-like silence. When it was launched, the bank positioned itself as a counter to the western led banks like the World Bank. CSOs and NGOs have fought hard to get better openness of their activities. However, it seems that for civil society and NGOs in the BRICS, countries have to struggle from from the scratch to get access to information about projects that are supposedly done for them.

Institutional bypassing

All Wetlands in India are covered under the Wetlands Authorities, and for Manipur it is the Manipur State Wetlands Authority which is housed in the Directorate of Environment and Climate Change. Responsibility for wetlands lies with the State Wetlands Authority, but the project is being implemented by the Water Resources Department. This mismatch highlights governance gaps and raises doubts about whether the right institutions are overseeing ecologically sensitive interventions.

Environmental Risks

The project has been classified as **Category B**, but given Lamphelpat's ecological importance, this categorization appears questionable. Civil society groups fear the initiative may convert the wetland into a pond-like water retention structure, destroying biodiversity and ecological functions.

Lamphelpat was the largest free ranging refuge and habitat for the endangered Manipuri ponies, one of the five recognised equines in the country. However, the project does not take into consideration the shared ecology and completely went on to dig up the wetlands to make a 12 feet deep artificial reservoir. In doing so, reports have highlighted that many ponies have fallen inside the cesspool of mud and have died. Thus, not only shrinking the habitat of an already endangered species, the project itself poses a great risk to the Manipuri ponies, who are in fear of extinction. Further, reports from May this year, the project witnessed a large-scale bloom of water hyacinth, thereby choking fish, accelerating siltation and raising flood risk.

NBD Investments in India: A Brief Analysis

IVIRAH AGARWAL

GLOBAL OVERVIEW

New Development Bank has 139 approved projects currently totally $42.9 billion in investments. The countries they have investments are India, China, Brazil, Russia, South Africa and Bangladesh. The key sectors they invest are transport infrastructure, clean energy and energy efficiency, water and sanitation, social infrastructure and environmental protection.

In terms of geographical distribution, projects in China and India received larger shares of NDB financing, representing 26.4% and 24.9% of the Bank's portfolio, respectively. The share of financing to clients in Brazil, South Africa, Russia, and Bangladesh stood at 18.8%, 18.0%, 10.6%, and 1.3% respectively.

A few highlights (source – NDB Annual Report 2025):





PROJECT PORTFOLIO BY FINANCING CURRENCY (AS AT DECEMBER 31, 2025)



PROJECT PORTFOLIO BY AREA OF OPERATION (AS AT DECEMBER 31, 2025)



PROJECTS IN INDIA

The sectoral distribution of NDB's investments and demonstrates a strong emphasis on infrastructure development. Transport Infrastructure accounts for more than half of the Bank's total financing, making it by far the largest investment category. Water and Sanitation represents the second-largest area of investment. This distribution indicates that NDB's financing priorities are strongly oriented towards large-scale infrastructure projects that support connectivity, urban development, essential public services, and sustainable economic growth.



The geographical distribution of NDB investments across Indian states, highlighting a notable concentration of financing in Madhya Pradesh, which receives the largest share of investment, followed by Maharashtra. This distribution suggests that NDB's financing has been particularly focused on infrastructure and development projects in these states, reflecting their significant role in the Bank's India portfolio. The concentration of investment also indicates a degree of regional prioritisation in the allocation of NDB resources.



The geographical distribution of ongoing NDB projects across India, with darker shades representing a higher concentration of projects and grey areas indicating the absence of ongoing projects. The distribution reveals a notable concentration of NDB-funded projects in the north-central region of India, alongside a significant presence in several southern states. This spatial pattern suggests that NDB project activity is unevenly distributed across the country, with financing and implementation concentrated in selected regions rather than being uniformly spread across all states.



The distribution of NDB loans in India between sovereign and non-sovereign borrowers. Of the total 37 loans, 28 are sovereign loans extended to the government, accounting for the majority of NDB financing activity, while the remaining 9 loans are directed towards private-sector entities. This distribution indicates a strong institutional preference for supporting public-sector infrastructure and development initiatives, with comparatively lower engagement with private firms.



List of Projects Financed by NDB in India

1. ReNew Peak Power Renewable Energy Project

- **Location:** Andhra Pradesh
- **State:** Andhra Pradesh
- **Type of Loan:** Non-Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 150 (NDB) + 451
- **Category:** Clean Energy and Energy Efficiency
- **Implementing Agency:** ReNew Vyoman Power Private Limited
- **Brief Description:** The loan to ReNew Vyoman Power Private Limited involves development of a hybrid renewable energy generation plant that consists of 250 MW wind power capacity, 435 MW solar power capacity and a 415 MWh battery energy storage system ("BESS"). It is designed to deliver electricity round the clock, as required by the electricity grid in India. The BESS equipped can be charged by excess power during non-peak hours, the overall combination of wind, solar and BESS capacity ensures the Project to deliver the required 300 MW PPA capacity during peak periods. The solar plant will be built on a fixed-price turnkey basis, with full commercial operation to be reached by October 2026. This aims to support India energy transition through expansion of renewable energy sources capacity and reduction of reliance on fossil fuels. It has been categorized as Category B in line with NDB's Environment and Social Framework. The Project's E&S risks are rated as 'medium' due to land use change, localized topography alterations, and operation phase potential impacts on avian species due to collision and electrocution, and noise and shadow flickering impact. No involuntary resettlement or impact on indigenous people was identified.

2. Serentica Captive Renewable Energy Project

- **Location:** Karnataka
- **State:** Karnataka
- **Type of Loan:** Non-Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 30 (NDB) + 414.7
- **Category:** Clean Energy and Energy Efficiency
- **Implementing Agency:** Serentica Renewables India 1 Private Limited
- **Brief Description:** The loan to Serentica Renewables India 1 Private Limited involves the development, construction and operation of 189.27 MW solar photovoltaic capacity and 204 MW wind generation capacity. The energy output of the Project has been tied up with Bharat Aluminium Company Limited ("BALCO"). This supports India's energy transition through expansion of renewable energy sources capacity and reduction of reliance on fossil fuels. The solar and wind power plants were contracted with third-party equipment suppliers on fixed-price turnkey basis. The Project has been categorized as Category B in line with the NDB Environment and Social (E&S) Framework. It has not resulted in the involuntary resettlement of individuals, nor will it negatively impact indigenous peoples. Based on the nature and scope of ongoing and future project activities, the potential adverse E&S impacts and risks are expected to be localized to the project footprints, largely reversible and temporary.

3. Mizoram Tuirini Small Hydro Project
- **Location:** Mizoram
- **State:** Mizoram
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Proposed
- **Amount ($ mn):** 64.6
- **Category:** Clean Energy and Energy Efficiency
- **Implementing Agency:** The Government of Mizoram
- **Brief Description:** The Project envisages construction of 24 MW hydropower plant by the Government, including construction of an earthen fill dam of 92-meter height to regulate water flow. It will also focus on activities aimed at institutional capacity building of the Project Entity, such as an enterprise resource planning software system, development of a scale model of the hydropower plant, and others. This aims to reduce Mizoram's energy cost by expanding its hydropower generation capacity. It is expected to avoid annual CO2 emissions by 48,500 tonnes per year.

4. SAEL 300MW Renewable Energy Project
- **Location:** Andhra Pradesh
- **State:** Andhra Pradesh
- **Type of Loan:** Non-Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 63 (NDB) + 127
- **Category:** Clean Energy and Energy Efficiency
- **Implementing Agency:** SAEL Solar MHP1 Private Limited
- **Brief Description:** The loan to SAEL Solar MHP1 Private Limited involves the design, development, construction, operation and maintenance of a 300 MW solar photovoltaic plant, a 70 kV sub-station and a 13 km 220 kV transmission line connecting the Project to the grid in Andra Pradesh. All power produced will be sold to the state-owned Solar Energy Corporation of India limited (SECI) on the back of a 25-year power purchase agreement (PPA) at a fixed tariff of INR 2.60/kWh. The PPA was awarded through an open tender process. SECI will on sell the power to Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited, the holding company for all state utilities in the state of Gujarat. This aims to promote clean energy power generation in India by increasing the installed capacity of utility scale solar photovoltaic power plants. The plant will be built on a fixed-price turnkey basis by SAEL Industries Limited as EPC contractor. Project has been categorized as Category B in line with NDB's ESF. Potential adverse impacts are expected to be limited to the foodprint, which is easily mitigated by folllowing industry standards. The Project will not require the physical resettlement of individuals nor cause adverse effects on Indigenous Peoples.

5. Adani Total City Gas Distribution Project
- **Location:**
- **State:**
- **Type of Loan:** Non-Sovereign
- **Status:** Proposed
- **Amount ($ mn):** 100
- **Category:** Clean Energy and Energy Efficiency
- **Implementing Agency:** Adani Total Gas Limited

- **Brief Description:** The Project will finance the development of city gas distribution (CGD) network in 33 geographical areas awarded by the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board to Adani Total Gas Limited (ATGL). The project comprises construction of infrastructure for connecting households, commercial institutions, and industrial users to piped natural gas and compressed natural gas. NDB's support will allow ATGL to mobilize financing for the Project to develop the CGD infrastructure to increase availability and improve accessibility, of natural gas for domestic, transport, commercial and industrial users thereby reducing consumption of more polluting alternative fuel products. Project contributes towards elevating energy efficiency of the regional economy and leads to inclusion of households and SMEs by enabling access to natural gas as affordable and cleaner fuel.

6. Lucknow Metro Rail (Phase – 1B) Project

- **Location:** Lucknow
- **State:** Uttar Pradesh
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Proposed
- **Amount ($ mn):** 311.4
- **Category:** Transport Infrastructure
- **Implementing Agency:** Uttar Pradesh Metro Rail Corporation Limited
- **Brief Description:** The loan will enable the Uttar Pradesh Metro Rail Corporation Limited to construct a new metro line (East-West corridor) in Lucknow (11.2 km, including 12 metro stations). Upon completion, the project will have a design capacity of 0.44 million daily ridership. This is to improve public transit system in Lucknow city, and is well aligned with national and state-level strategic frameworks for urban and transport development, including National Urban Transport Policy and Lucknow Master Plan 2031.

7. Hyderabad Elevated Corridor Project

- **Location:** Hyderabad
- **State:** Telengana
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Proposed
- **Amount ($ mn):** 427.35
- **Category:** Transport Infrastructure
- **Implementing Agency:** Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority
- **Brief Description:** The Project is a critical response to decongest the NH-44 and SH-01 junction through an integrated "Y"-shaped solution comprising two linked expressway corridors connecting the city center to these two highways. This comprises construction of two 6-lane elevated corridors in the city of Hyderabad including: (i) an 18.12 km expressway connecting State Highway-01, of which 11.14 km will be elevated; and (ii) a 5.40 km expressway, of which 3.05 km will be elevated, forming part of an 18.35 km feeder road to National Highway-44, with the balance being implemented by National Highways Authority of India. This aims to contribute to sustainable development of Hyderabad as envisaged in the Comprehensive Mobility Plan through upgrade of key urban transport infrastructure, leading to enhanced urban mobility, safety, and quality of life for residents.

8. Shriram Finance Sustainable Transport Project

- **Location:**

- **State:**
- **Type of Loan:** Non-Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 125 (NDB) + 375
- **Category:** Transport Infrastructure
- **Implementing Agency:** Shriram Finance Limited
- **Brief Description:** Shriram Finance Limited (SFL) is one of the largest NBFCs in India rfor commercial vehicle financing. NDB's loan will provide longer-term funding to SFL to support and expand SFL's lending for acquisition of low emitting and energy efficient sustainable vehicles for individual driver turned owners, first time borrowers, micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) including small road transport operators (SRTOs) having 4-5 vehicles engaged in transport and logistics in India. This will contribute to creating sustainable transport infrastructure, pollution reduction and decrease of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the country by increasing financing available for low carbon commercial vehicles. NDB funds will be used to finance commercial vehicles based on agreed eligibility criteria in terms of composition of vehicles based on fuel such as CNG/LNG/EV/BS-VI. The project will be implemented over a period of 18 months. TIt has been categorized as Category FI-C in line with the NDB ESF.

9. Madhya Pradesh State Highways Improvement Project

- **Location:** Madhya Pradesh
- **State:** Madhya Pradesh
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 300 (NDB) + 119.48 (GoMP)
- **Category:** Transport Infrastructure
- **Implementing Agency:** Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Limited
- **Brief Description:** The Project will support widening and reconstruction of SHs road sections with a total length of about 877 km in Madhya Pradesh to at least double lane road. It will promote climate resilient infrastructure development and include testing new materials in road construction, improving road safety, and implementing pilot initiatives in development of wayside amenities infrastructure. It aims to benefit over 12 million people, providing safe and enhanced road connectivity to more than 650 social, economic, and educational centers. The Project implementation will take place in five years by the Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Limited (MPRDC) which will be responsible for overall planning, execution and achievement of the desired results. This loan will finance procurement of civil works, goods and services contracts, in compliance with the country and state level procurement guidelines, as well as with the core principles of NDB Procurement Policy. The Project has been categorized as Category A in accordance with the NDB ESF. The main environmental and social impacts include diversion of forest land to non-forest use, cutting of roadside trees for road widening, land acquisition for realignment and safety improvements, potential involuntary resettlement especially for non-title holders and encroachers, impact on indigenous communities, deterioration of existing road and associated safety risks.

10. Shimla Innovative Urban Transportation Project

- **Location:** Shimla

- **State:** Himachal Pradesh
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Proposed
- **Amount ($ mn):** 152.95
- **Category:** Transport Infrastructure
- **Implementing Agency:** Ropeways and Rapid Transport System Development Corporation H.P. Limited
- **Brief Description:** The Project entails constructing an aerial ropeway transit network in Shimla, including stations and the network management system to provide efficient, safe and eco-friendly mobility within the city. The Project will decongest road traffic through transport modal shift and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, contributing to enhanced mobility and efficient transportation in Shimla city. Also, by demonstrating the feasibility and effectiveness of aerial ropeway transit solution, this is expected to set a precedent for other regions facing geographical and other constraints to conventional transport, to consider this solution as viable urban mass transport alternative.

11. Assam Bridge-II Project

- **Location:** Assam
- **State:** Assam
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 333.8 (NDB) + 70.95 (GoA)
- **Category:** Transport Infrastructure
- **Implementing Agency:** The Government of Assam
- **Brief Description:** The Project will construct a bridge over the Brahmaputra river with a total length of 12.2 km between Palasbari and Sualkuchi towns of the GMA. In addition to improved connectivity between the north and south parts of the GMA, the Project will provide diversion for regional and urban traffic in order to bypass the central business district of Guwahati, and to directly link the international airport to the industrial areas around Sualkuchi, which are currently under development. It is planned to be implemented in 4 years by the GoA through its APWRD. The Project has been classified as Category A in accordance with NDB ESF. The main environmental and social impacts are related to (i) the impacts on aquatic ecology of Brahmaputra river (specifically endangered Ganges River Dolphins (Platanista Gangetica)), (ii) land acquisition and resettlement, and (iii) construction related environmental impacts and occupational safety.

12. Gujarat Rural Road Program

- **Location:** Gujarat
- **State:** Gujarat
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 500 (NDB) + 434.94 (GoG)
- **Category:** Transport Infrastructure
- **Implementing Agency:** The Government of Gujarat
- **Brief Description:** The Program combines both investment and knowledge support to: (i) construct / improve about 13,500 km of rural roads and about 650 bridges / structures to enhance road connectivity and network efficiency; and (ii) introduce innovations, new technologies, climate resilient and safe road design, and strengthen institutional effectiveness of Roads and Buildings Department of

Government of Gujarat. The Program aims to improve rural connectivity and improved access to markets, health, and education centers. This is estimated to be implemented till March 2027 by the Government of Gujarat through its Roads and Buildings Department. The Program has been classified as Category A in accordance with the NDB ESF. The main environmental and social impacts of the Program are related to critical habitats due to activities in protected areas (wildlife sanctuaries), indigenous peoples as some roads will cross scheduled tribes areas, removal of roadside trees and vegetation and civil works-related impacts during the construction stage.

13. Corridor 4 of Phase II of Chennai Metro Rail Project

- **Location:** Chennai, Tamil Nadu
- **State:** Tamil Nadu
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 346.72 (NDB) + 1660.27
- **Category:** Transport Infrastructure
- **Implementing Agency:** Government of Tamil Nadu
- **Brief Description:** The Project will construct a new metro line (Corridor 4) in Chennai with a total length of 26.8 km, including 30 metro stations. It will have a design capacity to carry daily 0.5 million passenger trips. This is part of the Chennai Metro Rail Phase- II, which envisages constructing three metro rail corridors for a total route length of about 119.6 km. NDB loan will finance procurement of systems and equipment components for the Project. The Project has been classified as Category A in accordance with the NDB ESF. The main environmental and social impacts include the acquisition of 8.3 hectares of private land, triggering physical displacement of approximately 690 households and economic displacement of approximately 300 households, removal of approximately 540 trees, disruption of traffic and public utilities, occupational safety risks, and general environmental pollution emissions and discharges during construction and operation. These impacts will be addressed and mitigated by adherence to country system requirements and management plans developed for the Project.

14. Delhi-Ghaziabad- Meerut Regional Rapid Transit System Projec

- **Location:** Delhi NCR
- **State:** Delhi NCR
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 418 (NDB) + 3341
- **Category:** Transport Infrastructure
- **Implementing Agency:** National Capital Region Transport Corporation Limited
- **Brief Description:** The Project comprises construction of a rapid rail corridor with a total length of 82.15 km, both elevated and underground. The rail corridor will connect the National Capital Territory of Delhi with Ghaziabad and Meerut in Uttar Pradesh. 21 km of the corridor from Meerut South to Modipuram Depot will also be used to operate local transit services within Meerut City. This transit system will reduce the travel time from Delhi to Meerut to about an hour. The objective of the Project is to develop an efficient and sustainable regional transport system to reduce congestion in Delhi. NDB has considered project implementation period until August 2027 by the Ministry of Housing & Urban Affairs through the National Capital Region Transport Corporation Limited will be

the Implementing Agency. The Project is Category A in line with NDB's ESF. E&S impacts during construction include land acquisition and resettlement, diversion of forest land, removal and transplantation of trees, community health and safety such as traffic disruption during construction, and noise and vibration impacts to communities along the alignment.

15. Mumbai Metro Rail II (Line 6) Project

- **Location:** Mumbai
- **State:** Maharashtra
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 241 (NDB) + 509 (GoM)
- **Category:** Transport Infrastructure
- **Implementing Agency:** Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority
- **Brief Description:** The Project comprises financing of equipment for implementing the proposed metro Line 6 in Mumbai which will provide rail-based connectivity between the western and eastern suburbs. This aims to improve Mumbai's transport and traffic conditions through providing a modern metro system, featuring high-capacity, safe, and comfortable mode of transport. It is estimated to be implemented over four years by the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority. The Project is categorized as Category A in line with NDB's ESF. Main environmental and social impacts include acquisition of private land and resettlement, occupational safety, removal of trees, and temporary traffic disruption.

16. Mumbai Urban Transport Project Phase 3A-II

- **Location:** Mumbai
- **State:** Maharashtra
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Proposed
- **Amount ($ mn):** 500
- **Category:** Transport Infrastructure
- **Implementing Agency:** Mumbai Railway Vikas Corporation Limited
- **Brief Description:** The Mumbai Urban Transport Project Phase 3A-II (MUTP 3A-II) is proposed to address the challenge with Mumbai's transport infrastructure with the objective to reduce congestion, improve mobility, enhance safety and comfort of travel, and improve quality of lives of the people living and working in Mumbai. The Project comprises: (i) procurement of rolling stock featuring 191 air-conditioned electric multiple unit rakes with each rake having 12 coaches; (ii) construction and upgrade of maintenance facilities for rolling stock for the suburban railway network of Mumbai Metropolitan Region; and (iii) institutional strengthening and capacity building component. The Project will augment and strengthen the suburban railway network of the Mumbai Metropolitan Region.

17. Indore Metro Rail Project

- **Location:** Indore
- **State:** Madhya Pradesh
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 225 (NDB) + 250 + 725 (Counterpart)
- **Category:** Transport Infrastructure
- **Implementing Agency:** Madhya Pradesh Metro Rail Corporation Limited

- **Brief Description:** Indore Metro Rail Project is proposed to construct a metro line of about 31 km in Indore with an annual traffic estimated to be about 126 million passenger trips. The positive impacts of the Project include: (i) reduced travel time for commuters; (ii) reduced congestion on the affected roads; (iii) reduced emissions from vehicles; (iv) enhanced transport safety and comfort of travel; (v) improved mobility and access to markets, workplaces, education, and health facilities; (vi) improved quality of living for the connected population. The Project is estimated to be implemented over five years by the Madhya Pradesh Metro Rail Corporation Limited (MPMRCL) will be the Project Implementation Agency. The Project is Category "A" in line with NDB's ESF. Main environmental and social impacts include land acquisition and resettlement, diversion of forest land for non-forest use and removal of trees, works in proximity of archaeological structures, construction waste and debris, occupational health and safety, and noise and vibration during operations.

18. Andhra Pradesh Road Sector Project

- **Location:** Andhra Pradesh
- **State:** Andhra Pradesh
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 140.9 (NDB) + 60.4 (GoAP)
- **Category:** Transport Infrastructure
- **Implementing Agency:** The Government of Andhra Pradesh
- **Brief Description:** The Andhra Pradesh Road Sector Projects are proposed to address the connectivity challenges faced in Andhra Pradesh through upgrading state highways and district roads of heavy traffic, and reconstructing bridges that are obsolete. This includes: i) widening approximately 1,231 km of state highways from single/intermediate lane to double lane; and ii) constructing 236 bridges in the state highways network. The two Projects will be implemented over a period of five years from 2020 to 2024 by The Roads and Buildings Department of Government of Andhra Pradesh. The Projects are Category "B" in line with NDB's ESF. Main environmental and social impacts include loss of habitats due to vegetation clearance, air emissions and noise, impacts on surface water quality and aquatic ecology, waste generation and disposal, land acquisition and associated displacement of people. These risks will be mitigated by implementing country system requirements and NDB's ESF.

19. Assam Bridge Project

- **Location:** Guwahati
- **State:** Assam
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 300 (NDB) + 77 (GoA)
- **Category:** Transport Infrastructure
- **Implementing Agency:** The Government of Assam
- **Brief Description:** The Project aims to improve transport network connectivity across the Brahmaputra River, increasing mobility and accessibility to social, health, educational and economic centers. The construction of the bridge and approach roads will improve the daily commute of people between the main city area and the institutional and industrial areas of north Guwahati, such as IIT-Guwahati, NLU Assam, AIIMS, Bio Tech Park, Industrial Park, and College Nagar. Project components and outputs are: (i) Bridge over the river, (ii) South Bank

Alignment with a Y-junction and a new 3-lane road along the south riverbank, (iii) North Bank Alignment with a viaduct connecting the main bridge to the existing roads and approach roads connecting to NH-31. The Project was to be implemented by 2025 by the Government of Assam through its Assam Public Works Department. The positive impacts of the Project include improved mobility and transport network connectivity across the Brahmaputra River and to NHs, reduced travel time, and reduced carbon emissions by vehicles due to reduced travel distance and fuel consumption. The Project is Category "A" in line with NDB ESF. Main environmental and social impacts include land acquisition and involuntary resettlement of people; impacts on river habitats and endangered Ganges River Dolphins; removal of trees and vegetation; dust and noise emissions; construction waste and debris management; and workers' health & safety issues.

20. Mumbai Metro Rail (Line 2&7) Project

- **Location:** Mumbai
- **State:** Maharashtra
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 260 (NDB) + 926 + 1,314 (MMRDA)
- **Category:** Transport Infrastructure
- **Implementing Agency:** Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority
- **Brief Description:** The objective of the Project is to enhance the city's public transportation capacity. This includes construction of (i) Line 2A from Dahisar East to DN Nagar; (ii) Line 2B from DN Nagar to Mandale; (iii) Line 7 from Andheri East to Dahisar East. The Project will supplement the existing suburban railway network, and also provide rail based mass transit facility to areas that are not currently connected by the existing transport network. This will lead to reduced travel time for commuters, shift in travel pattern from road to rail thereby resulting in decongestion of roads and improved transport safety. The Project is estimated to be completed by December 2026 by the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority. It is classified as Category "A" in accordance with the NDB Environmental and Social Framework. Negative environmental and social impacts mainly pertain to land acquisition and resettlement, noise and vibration from elevated metro lines, temporary disruption of transportation during construction, dust and emissions.

21. Madhya Pradesh Major District Roads II Project

- **Location:** Madhya Pradesh
- **State:** Madhya Pradesh
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 302.44 (NDB) + 129.62 (GoMP)
- **Category:** Transport Infrastructure
- **Implementing Agency:** The Government of Madhya Pradesh
- **Brief Description:** The proposed NDB loan will be used by the Government of India for on-lending to the State Government of Madhya Pradesh for rehabilitating Major District Roads with a total length of about 2,000 km. The objective is to improve connectivity of Madhya Pradesh's rural interior. It complements the MP Roads I Project financed by NDB in 2016 and will maximize the benefits of the MP Roads I Project by further removing the bottlenecks and smoothing the traffic flows. This will improve road conditions and enhance

transport capacity, which will lead to benefits of less travel time, reduced vehicles operating cost, reduced emissions, and improved road safety. The Project is estimated to be implemented over 5 years by The Government of Madhya Pradesh through its Madhya Pradesh Public Works Department. The Project has been classified as category B in accordance with NDB's ESF, as its impacts are temporary and site specific and can be mitigated by adherence to established environmental and social practices and requirements of India's country system. The negative impacts mainly pertain to noise generation, water and air quality deterioration, slow traffic, flora removal, potential impacts on local communities from influx of construction labor, workers and public safety, etc.

22. Madhya Pradesh Bridges Project

- **Location:** Madhya Pradesh
- **State:** Madhya Pradesh
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 175 (NDB) + 75 (GoMP)
- **Category:** Transport Infrastructure
- **Implementing Agency:** The Government of Madhya Pradesh
- **Brief Description:** The Project aims at constructing and upgrading about 350 bridges in Madhya Pradesh. The NDB loan will be used by the Government of India for on-lending to the State Government of Madhya Pradesh, to reconstruct selected bridges that are weak, narrow and accident-prone, with the majority built more than 40 years ago and past the design life. The objective of the Project is to tackle the weak links of the road network to realize the full benefits of upgrading the State Highways and Major Districts Roads. The full-functioning bridges after the completion of the Project will provide all weather connectivity, improved safety, and reduced travel time, which will lead to less travel time, reduced vehicles operating cost, and reduced emissions. Another nonnegligible important impact of the this is to help realize the full benefits of those projects that focus on upgrading the Major District Roads in the State. The Project is estimated to be implemented over 6 years by the Madhya Pradesh Public Works Department. The Project has been classified as category B in accordance with the NDB ESF, as its impacts are temporary and site specific and can be mitigated by adherence to established environmental and social practices and requirements of India's country system. The Project involves resettlement and land acquisition.

23. Bihar Rural Roads Project

- **Location:** Bihar
- **State:** Bihar
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 350 (NDB) + 150 (GoB)
- **Category:** Transport Infrastructure
- **Implementing Agency:** Bihar Rural Road Development Agency
- **Brief Description:** The objective of the Project is helping the State of Bihar to enhance local connectivity and improve the state's transportation infrastructure through constructing and upgrading rural roads with total length of 4,000 km, spreading across 26 districts in the state. The NDB will support the Project through a Multi-tranche Financing Facility with a total loan amount of USD 350 million. The rural roads proposed for NDB's loan were selected under the Mukhya Mantri Gram Sampark Yojana Program by the Government of Bihar, using a

prioritization matrix with parameters including: i) total beneficiary population; ii) traffic on the road; iii) connectivity to national highways, state highways and district roads; iv) connectivity to socio-economic centers and district headquarters. The Project will bring benefits of improved connectivity and access to economic, social and educational centers for the rural population of Bihar, therefore enhancing farm productivity, and increasing income and economic growth for the populace in the interior regions of the state of Bihar. The Project is categorized as "B" in accordance with the NDB Environment and Social Framework with limited adverse social and environmental impacts. The adverse impacts are site specific and temporary.

24. Madhya Pradesh Major District Roads Project

- **Location:** Madhya Pradesh
- **State:** Madhya Pradesh
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 327.73 (NDB) + 135.82 (GoMP)
- **Category:** Transport Infrastructure
- **Implementing Agency:** Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Limited
- **Brief Description:** The Project supported the upgradation of about 1543 km of Major District Roads to intermediate lane width, with 5.5m wide carriageway, all-weather access, proper signage, pedestrian crossings and other road safety features. The objective of the Project was to improve transport connectivity to the interior regions of Madhya Pradesh with the district headquarters and state road network and the resultant increase to economic activity in the rural hinterland. The project was implemented in over 5 years by the Government of Madhya Pradesh, through MP Road Development Corporation Limited. The project was categorized as Category B in accordance with the NDB Environment and Social Framework. NDB's due diligence on environmental and social aspects found that no land acquisition or involuntary resettlement was required as the roads were construction within the existing right of way. No forest diversion occurred in the project.

25. Avanse Education Infrastructure Project

- **Location:** Tier II–IV cities
- **State:**
- **Type of Loan:** Non-Sovereign
- **Status:** Proposed
- **Amount ($ mn):** 50
- **Category:** Social Infrastructure
- **Implementing Agency:** Avanse Financial Services Limited
- **Brief Description:** The loan will provide Avanse Financial Services Limited with longer-term funding to support and expand its own lending for school infrastructure projects in tier II-IV cities by constructing classrooms and laboratories, digitising schools, and installing solar rooftops and water recycling systems. This supports NEP 2020 and the Samagra Shiksha Abhiyan framework to bridge regional gaps in educational quality, equity, and access to foster inclusive, holistic development.

26. Piramal Finance Affordable Housing Project

- **Location:**
- **State:**

- **Type of Loan:** Non-Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 75 (NDB) + 225
- **Category:** Social Infrastructure
- **Implementing Agency:** Piramal Finance Limited
- **Brief Description:** Piramal Finance Limited (PFL) is a large listed NBFC, and is an established player in the affordable housing finance segment in India. NDB's loan will provide longer-term funding to PFL to support and expand its lending for individual housing loans to Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) and Low Income Group (LIG) for acquisition and construction of affordable houses. The project compliments the Government of India's 'Housing for All' plan and increases affordable house ownership among EWS and LIG segments. The eligibility criteria also prioritize states with higher housing shortage and lower income levels for greater development impact. The project will be implemented over a period of 24 months. It has been categorized as Category FI-C (minimal or no adverse environmental impacts) in line with the NDB Environment and Social Framework (ESF). An Environmental and Social Impact Management Plan has been developed to ensure compliance with the provisions of the country systems and the NDB ESF.

27. National Investment and Infrastructure Fund: Private Markets Fund – II

- **Location:**
- **State:**
- **Type of Loan:** Non-Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 100 (NDB) + 900
- **Category:** Multiple Areas
- **Implementing Agency:** National Investment and Infrastructure Fund Limited
- **Brief Description:** National Investment and Infrastructure Fund Limited (NIIF), a fund manager sponsored by the Government of India (GoI), is raising its second fund of funds named Private Markets Fund II (PMF-II) to mobilize private equity investment in sustainable infrastructure and other priority sectors. PMF-II seeks to raise INR 86.5 billion for investments in energy transition and climate action, urban and social infrastructure, digital and tech-enabled infrastructure, etc. The GoI has committed up to 49% of the fund's total commitments. NDB is already an anchor investor in NIIF's first private markets fund (PMF-I), to which it committed USD 100 million (INR equivalent) in 2020. PMF-II will build on its predecessor, aiming to develop a diversified portfolio of 12-15 portfolio funds and portfolio companies. NDB will monitor its investment as a representative on PMF-II advisory board. The Project has been categorized as Category FI-A in line with the NDB ESF.

28. Meghalaya Ecotourism Infrastructure Development Project

- **Location:** Meghalaya
- **State:** Meghalaya
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 79.05(NDB) + 15.3 (GoM)
- **Category:** Multiple Areas
- **Implementing Agency:** Meghalayan Age Limited
- **Brief Description:** The Project will cover; i) construction of nine tourism/ecotourism attractions, (ii) development of high value and rural

accommodation at strategic locations to increase the length of stay of tourists (323 accommodation units), (iii) construction of connecting infrastructure to improve access to the tourist attraction points (construction of 114 kilometres of roads and bridges, and Shillong Peak ropeway), and (iv) institutional capacity building and project management. This is to promote tourism in Meghalaya, leading to development of 5 ecotourism circuits, identified by the Government of Meghalaya (GoM). It will result in direct employment opportunities for more than 1,400 people during operational phase. The Project will also contribute to reduced greenhouse gas emissions through replacement of road travels by the ropeway. This will be completed by July 2028 by the GoM and Meghalayan Age Limited. The Project has been classified as Category B in accordance with the NDB Environment and Social Framework (ESF). The main environmental and social impacts include using community land for infrastructure development, diversion of forest land, likely impact on indigenous people, and occupational and community health and safety during Project implementation.

29. National Investment and Infrastructure Fund: Fund of Funds – I

- **Location:**
- **State:**
- **Type of Loan:** Non-Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 100 (NDB) + 480
- **Category:** Multiple Areas
- **Implementing Agency:** National Investment and Infrastructure Fund Limited
- **Brief Description:** Fund of Funds-I will investment in approx. 10 portfolio funds focused on green infrastructure, social infrastructure, mid-income and affordable housing, infrastructure services, agribusiness, consumer business, financial services, technology and industrials (with emphasis on job creation and supporting small and medium enterprises). NDB's investment through FoF-I and its portfolio funds will be made in investee companies which can leverage this investment for mobilizing additional capital through borrowing from banks and capital markets. Thus, the Bank's investment will have significant multiplier effects and mobilize additional capital. The Project is Category FI-B in line with NDB's ESF. The portfolio funds will have E&S screening, appraisal, and supervision of investee companies as per Fund Level – E&S Management System (FL-ESMS), which will be aligned with the NIIF's E&S management policy, E&S management system principles (ESMS Principles), and E&S management system and procedures (ESMS&P) for FoF-I.

30. Southeast Guwahati Water Supply Project

- **Location:** Guwahati
- **State:** Assam
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 89.03 (NDB) + 45.22
- **Category:** Water and Sanitation
- **Implementing Agency:** The Government of Assam
- **Brief Description:** The Project involves construction of water supply infrastructure to provide improved and regular water supply to the southeast zone of the Guwahati city. The major components of the Project include water intake system, raw water rising main to the treatment plant, water treatment plant, reservoirs, and distribution network with household connections. It aims to

provide access to 24×7 piped drinking water supply. The Government of Assam will be in charge for overall planning, guiding and monitoring its execution. Guwahati Metropolitan Drinking Water and Sewerage Board will be responsible for day-to-day implementation over 5 years. This has been categorized as Category B in accordance with the NDB ESF. The main environmental and social (E&S) risks stem from potential adverse impacts during construction period such as effects on the aquatic environment and species due to bottom dredging works and construction of water intake, clearance of native vegetation, occupational and community health & safety risks, and potential unforeseen resettlement impacts.

31. Kohima Water Supply Augmentation Project

- **Location:** Kohima
- **State:** Nagaland
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Proposed
- **Amount ($ mn):** 39.73
- **Category:** Water and Sanitation
- **Implementing Agency:** Government of Nagaland
- **Brief Description:** The Project aims to augment Kohima's water supply system by developing a water intake facility, raw water transmission lines from the intake to a new water treatment plant, service reservoirs, and an expanded distribution network with household connections. This will provide access to 24×7 piped drinking water supply of at least 135 liters per capita per day, sufficient for the entire population of Kohima city.

32. Integrated Sewerage System for City of Imphal (Phase II) Project

- **Location:** Imphal
- **State:** Manipur
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 115 (NDB) + 35.85 (GoM)
- **Category:** Water and Sanitation
- **Implementing Agency:** The Government of Manipur
- **Brief Description:** The Project will develop the existing sanitation system of the city and adjacent peri-urban areas through construction of sewerage treatment plants, sewerage pumping stations and a network of sewer pipelines, and thus provide sewerage services in areas of Imphal not yet covered by sewered sanitation system. This also includes information and communication activities, which will increase awareness among the rural population about the importance of safe drinking water, improve citizen participation, and instill ownership behavior for water supply schemes. It also includes capacity building activities, such as training for sanitation workers and supervisory staff, and strengthening laboratory testing capabilities. It is estimated to be implemented over 4 years by the GoM through its Public Health Engineering Department. The Project has been classified as Category B in accordance with the NDB ESF. The main E&S risks arise from excavation of roads in the urban area of the city to lay sewers and the associated traffic disruptions, interruptions of municipal utilities and businesses, occupational and public safety during construction, and odor problems from pumping stations and sewerage treatment plants during operation.

33. Himachal Pradesh Rural Water Supply Project

- **Location:** Himachal Pradesh
- **State:** Himachal Pradesh
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 80 (NDB) + 20 (GoHP)
- **Category:** Water and Sanitation
- **Implementing Agency:** Government of Himachal Pradesh
- **Brief Description:** The Project will construct 24 rural water supply schemes to provide drinking water to 1,255 villages covering eight districts in Himachal Pradesh. It also includes information and communication activities, which will increase awareness among the rural population about the importance of safe drinking water, improve citizen participation, and instill ownership behavior for water supply schemes. The objective of the Project is to provide piped drinking water to 14% of the total partially covered rural habitations and improve the quality of water supplied. It will be completed by 2026 by the GoHP through the Jal Shakti Vibhag. The Project is Category B in line with NDB's ESF. The environmental and social impacts of the project will mainly include (i) conversion of forest land and associated impacts on biodiversity, (ii) impacts of surface and groundwater abstraction, (iii) common impacts derived from civil works such as air emissions, noise, waste and wastewater, and (iv) workers' health and safety issues during the construction stage. This will not require physical resettlement or people or significant acquisition of private land.

34. Lamphelpat Waterbody Rejuvenation Project

- **Location:** Lamphelpat
- **State:** Manipur
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 70.27 (NDB) + 13.62 (GoM)
- **Category:** Water and Sanitation
- **Implementing Agency:** The Government of Manipur
- **Brief Description:** The Project will develop Lamphelpat waterbody to increase its water detention capacity, restore stormwater drainage system and channels/streams in the catchment area, improve water security in Imphal by utilization of stored water in Lamphelpat waterbody as additional source of drinking water, and construct green spaces, arc bridge, biodiversity zone and tourism facilities around Lamphelpat waterbody to develop tourism potential of the area. This will also enhance environmental and flood management capacity in Imphal through operationalization of real time flood management system with a command center. It is estimated to be implemented over 5 years by the GoM through its Water Resources Department. The Project has been classified as Category B in accordance with the NDB ESF. Key environmental and social (E&S) impacts are associated with dredging of marshy areas of the existing waterbody, resettlement of land users in the vicinity of the Project, disposal of dredged material, and occupational health and safety.

35. Manipur Water Supply Project

- **Location:** Manipur
- **State:** Manipur
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 312 (NDB) + 78 (GoM)

- **Category:** Water and Sanitation
- **Implementing Agency:** The Government of Manipur
- **Brief Description:** The Manipur Water Supply Project is proposed to upgrade the Sate's drinking water supply infrastructure. This includes construction of drinking water supply systems in: i) Imphal Planning Area, the capital city of Manipur; ii) 25 other towns; and iii) 1,731 rural habitations. The Project will provide safe drinking water supply to about 3.11 million people in Manipur by 2025. This is to be implemented over five years by The Public Health Engineering Department of Government of Manipur. The Project is Category "B" in line with NDB's ESF. Main environmental and social impacts include: (i) clearance of existing land, vegetation or building; (ii) generation of construction and demolition wastes including scraps; (iii) soil erosion and silt runoff, particularly at intake works; and (iv) community safety risks. E&S impacts will be mitigated by adherence to Indian E&S regulations and implementation of E&S management plans specifically developed for the Project.

36. Rajasthan Water Sector Restructuring Project

- **Location:** Rajasthan
- **State:** Rajasthan
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 345 (NDB) + 103.5 (GoR)
- **Category:** Water and Sanitation
- **Implementing Agency:** The Government of Rajasthan
- **Brief Description:** The objective of this Project is rehabilitation of Indira Gandhi canal system to prevent seepage, conserve water, and enhance water usage efficiency. The Indira Gandhi canal system was designed as one of the largest irrigations systems in India, this will now help in arresting seepage of water through rehabilitation of the deteriorating canal lining, which will improve water carrying efficiency of the canal system and enable reclamation of waterlogged areas. The Project also includes capacity building measures for strengthening the capacity of local water users' associations, agricultural institutions, water resources department and farmers. These measures will facilitate adoption of modern irrigation and sustainable farm techniques, and optimal utilization of irrigation systems. The Project was planned to be implemented by February 2025 by The Government of Rajasthan through its Water Resources Department. The Project will help conserve water and enhance water usage efficiency. Environmental and social impact are related to rehabilitation through desilting and relining of canals, reclamation of waterlogged areas, micro irrigation and capacity building. Civil works activities for both the phases are similar in nature. There will be no rehabilitation issues. Risk classification of Phase I and Phase II is Category "B".

37. Madhya Pradesh Multi Village Water Supply Project

- **Location:** Madhya Pradesh
- **State:** Madhya Pradesh
- **Type of Loan:** Sovereign
- **Status:** Approved
- **Amount ($ mn):** 470 (NDB) + 200 (GoMP)
- **Category:** Water and Sanitation
- **Implementing Agency:** Madhya Pradesh Jal Nigam Maryadit

- **Brief Description:** The objective of the Project is to provide piped drinking water to rural areas of Madhya Pradesh and to help the state's water program to achieve 100% household water connections. This will support 9 multi-village rural water supply schemes in Madhya Pradesh, covering 3,400 villages and benefiting over 3 million people. Availability of clean water at household level will significantly impact the standards of living for the villagers, who will benefit largely from saved water-fetching time, reduction of water-borne diseases, and improved sanitation conditions. The Government of Madhya Pradesh is responsible for implementation and oversight. The Project is classified as Category "B". NDB's due diligence on environmental and social assessments found the limited negative impacts are site-specific and mitigation plans have been put in place. Land acquisition and use of forest land are minimized for optimal project design. Compliance with environment and social regulations in India and with the core principles of NDB's Environment and Social Framework will be ensured.

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